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1 Competence-performance and levels
of description
First of all we would like to thank the commentators for their efforts that
resulted in thoughtful and significant comments about our account.1 We are
delighted that the main thesis we presented – the inclusion of interactive
language use within the remit of grammars – seems to have received an
unexpected consensus from such diverse perspectives. As each commentary
deserves a more detailed consideration than space limitations would allow
here, we will aim to address the most urgent issues and clarify what we see as
misunderstandings.
Ruth Kempson, Department of Philosophy, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS,
UK, E-mail: ruth.kempson@kcl.ac.uk
Ronnie Cann, Department of Linguistics and English Language, University of Edinburgh, Old
College, South Bridge, Edinburgh EH8 9YL, UK
Eleni Gregoromichelaki, Department of Philosophy, King's College London, Strand, London
WC2R 2LS, UK; Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, Neuer Graben, 49074
Osnabrück, Germany
Stergios Chatzikyriakidis, Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, Theory of Science, University
of Gothenburg, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; Open University of Cyprus, B1 33, Latsia 2220,
Cyprus
1 In particular we thank Poesio and Rieser for their thorough reading drawing attention to
typing errors that impede understanding. For example, indeed, they are correct that the double
pointer on Diagram (48) in the paper is a typo. The double pointer device is only employed as a
device to implement distinct perspectives on the parse (Eshghi et al. 2015), something we have
not included in this paper. Given that comprehensive rule presentation presupposes the formal
details of all the logics that intersect in the definition of the framework (see e.g. Kempson et al.
2001, Ch. 9), we did not include an appendix listing all the rules; instead, we elected to provide
intuitive and concise descriptions indicating through references where the formal details can be
found.
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The data which form the focus of the current debate are split utterances such
as (1)-(3), which we argued have to fall within the remit of grammar:
(1) A: Erm, this weekend, right?
B: right
A: we’re going to..
B: to Aber Trynant, no?
C: uh?
A: where Ann,
B: Auntie Ann,
A: has just moved and we’d like to
C (interrupting): with the dogs?
B: if you can keep them under control
C: in the garden?
A: unless it rains
C: which it always does
In connection with these, it is important to note that inclusion of dialogue data
within grammar analyses is not unique to us. Ginzburg, Cooper, and colleagues
and, indeed, Poesio and Rieser have long argued for such a perspective
(Ginzburg and Cooper 2004; Poesio and Rieser 2010). However, since its incep-
tion, Dynamic Syntax (DS, Kempson et al. 2001) has been motivated by integrat-
ing general processing mechanisms firstly introduced within semantics/
pragmatics, more importantly, underspecification and update, within the gram-
mar formalism. In all its forms and incarnations (ranging from the labelled
deductive system (LDS) of Kempson (1996) to DS-TTR of Purver et al. 2010), DS
also includes a non-linguistic concept of context subserving both the analysis of
monologue and dialogue. So the split-utterance data come as further confirma-
tion of this perspective and we took them as further evidence of the need to
incorporate the time-linearity and context-dependency of processing within the
grammar framework itself, underpinning both parsing and production. As we
argued, in our view, this is what yields linguistic creativity, which is thus
fundamentally a result of interaction. Therefore we are proposing that the
structure of language crucially reflects its functioning in coordinating human
interaction both with the environment and other people.
Nowadays, we are not alone in adopting this broad theoretical orientation,
as Poesio and Rieser note: modelling incrementality has been a concern of
other frameworks from categorial grammar (Steedman 2000; Morrill 2011) and
Tree-Adjoining Grammars (Lombardo and Sturt 2002; Mazzei et al. 2007;
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Demberg-Winterfors 2010) to functionalist accounts (O’Grady 2005). However,
our more radical proposal states that this stance presupposes the abandonment
of the analysis of linguistic structure on the basis of phrase-structure grammars
which impose constituency analyses/derivations on strings expressed as syntac-
tic types (categories, non-terminals). This view is pervasive, in particular, this is
the type of grammatical analysis presupposed in Cooper (2014) even though the
grammar as a whole eventually categorises speech events instead of abstract
string-interpretation pairings. The same applies much more fundamentally to
the grammar outlined in Kobele, Merchant, Kobele and Merchant where this
assumption is essential for the claimed results. Various consequences follow
from our differentiation. First of all, if the phenomena being explained by
reference to the phrase structure of natural language (NL) strings are explain-
able without it, as DS sets out to prove, then theoretical parsimony indicates that
the assumption of such a string-based organisation is at best redundant.
Secondly, we have claimed that such an approach misses important general-
isations by targeting the wrong level of explanation (see e.g. Gregoromichelaki
et al. 2013; Gregoromichelaki in press). Therefore, eventually, such models are
only able to deliver approximations of solutions to the puzzles that do not scale
up well. But, more importantly, the distinction that DS aims to highlight is that
instead of assigning psychological reality to hierarchical structures on strings,
we need to directly attribute structure to meanings, whether these are repre-
sented as trees (Cann et al. 2005; 2012), TTR representations (Purver et al. 2010;
Eshghi et al. 2013; Hough 2015) or geometrical structures (Gärdenfors 2014;
Gregoromichelaki 2017). We then take a processing perspective on “syntax” as
directly building/linearising conceptual structure and view these parsing/pro-
duction processes as adequate to express all generalisations and regularities
that appear when examining the apparent structuring of NLs. Thus, by removing
the representational level of syntactic structure, we explicitly and formally
model “syntax” as actions, procedures that reflect the factors that a psycholin-
guistic model would employ as explanatory. Words and the other stimuli
involved in signal-categorisation are then modelled as “affordances” (action-
triggers) that participants can take advantage of to coordinate with each other
(Gregoromichelaki 2013a, in press; Kempson and Gregoromichelaki in press). As
Cooper rightly urges, this embeds the theory of syntax, and generally linguistic
behaviour, within a theory of human action while trying to preserve the insights
gained by previous formal analyses.
For this reason, unlike what Kobele assumes, we do not continue “to
abstract away from memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and
interest, and errors”, so we do not in our practice adopt the standard compe-
tence-performance distinction as he describes it. Indeed all such phenomena are
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the target of enquiry: disfluencies, corrections, restarts, repairs are all to be
modelled within the grammar (see e.g. Kempson et al. 2007; Gargett et al. 2008;
Gregoromichelaki et al. 2009; Eshghi et al. 2015; Hough 2015). Within formal
grammars, we are not alone in taking this stance (see Ginzburg and Poesio 2016
and references there). Additionally, in line with embodied approaches, we do
not exclude the fact that machine/neural implementations might introduce
properties of the system that need to be reflected in its architecture (for example,
memory upper bounds in processing, see e.g. Honing and Zuidema 2014;
Perruchet and Rey 2005; reconsideration of representational constructs, see
e.g. Milkowski 2013; cf. Lewis and Phillips 2015). We therefore disagree with
Kobele in that we believe that in his commentary he confuses legitimate
idealisation/abstraction tools and devices (see also Stokhof and van
Lambalgen 2011) with the standard interpretation of the competence-
performance distinction so that the latter ends up having no empirical content
at all (which might explain his puzzlement and conclusions). Therefore, given
that we take the competence-performance differentiation seriously, we think it is
perfectly sensible to question the theoretical assumptions that underpin its
standard formulation.2 It is not good enough, in our view, to present it as a
harmless idealisation having to do just with the selection of relevant data: the
distinction has been used to make hypotheses about mental architecture and the
nature of “grammar” (Chomsky 1965 and many others following over decades).
Regarding Marr’s levels-distinction, from what we can understand from his
position, we think we are in agreement with Kobele’s conclusion in that we do
aim primarily at explanation at the algorithmic level. This is because computa-
tional-level explanations, as e.g. his account, view linguistic processing in
“black box” terms considering only inputs and outputs and can be implemented
by a large number of non-intensionally-equivalent algorithms. Instead of
remaining agnostic as regards the mechanisms, we elevate them as crucial
both for the explanation of the empirical phenomena and for the parsimony of
the general theory. So we are interested in directly modelling processes, peering
inside the transitions of the “automaton” as White so aptly puts it (crucially
though incorporating the time-linear dimension too) (see Kempson et al. 2015).
Unlike Kobele, we are not aiming at abstract descriptions of processes that can
be implemented in various ways and, consequently, we also do not claim to
model abstract processes of “derivation” or proof-search (Kobele 2015; cf. Morrill
and Valentin 2015) because, for those, psycholinguistic insights like incremen-
tality and the attendant underspecification are not essential characteristics.
2 If Kobele and colleagues have already rejected the standard competence-performance dis-
tinction we would be very pleased to hear that we are in agreement.
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2 The nature of the grammar
Unlike DS’s action articulation, the grammar presented by Kobele here and
in various places remains the analysis of a system of “signs” with syntactic
categories being the glue that holds together two independent systems of
sound (phonology) and meaning (semantics). Unlike DS, syntactic processes
do not have direct access to the semantic structure so underspecification and
update can only be modelled by means of empty strings, string-constituency
manipulations etc., and an attendant multiple ‘spurious ambiguity’ problem.
Categories, or so-called nowadays syntactic types, still remain sets of strings
expressing hierarchical constituency assumptions only now paired with
semantic interpretation. We do find accounts based on Categorial Grammar
and the general framework of Minimalist Grammars (MG: Stabler 1997; Kobele
2012a, 2012b, 2015) much closer to ours than standard syntactic accounts like
the traditional minimalist/HPSG ones we mentioned in the paper.
Additionally, we find Kobele’s (2015) account of ellipsis and Kobele and
Merchant’s comments more convincing than their previous accounts
(Kempson et al. forthcoming). However, even though Kobele’s current
account has significant advantages over standard syntactic accounts, and
despite the similarity of the formal tools employed there to our analysis of
VP-ellipsis (first appearing in print in Purver et al. 2006), conceptually, it still
maintains standard assumptions regarding syntax which, from our point of
view, lead both to empirical and to meta-theoretical difficulties that we
itemise in the following.
Firstly, the Kobele and Stabler formalisms ground their assumptions about
syntactic categories, syntactic operations, and syntactic constraints (the “tecto-
grammar”) on standard assumptions that still maintain the ‘autonomy of syntax’
hypothesis, however diluted this has become there and however much they have
contributed to the move towards a less “syntactocentric” framework. Even if
such grammars aim at transparency between syntactic and semantic rules, even
if Move is assimilated to Merge, or local and global constraints are pushed into
the category system (Graf 2013), the fact remains that they take the parser/
generator model as relying on such arbitrary syntactic foundations instead of
the other way round (for example, Stabler (1997) and Kobele here argue expli-
citly against the usefulness of insights from parsing for grammar design). In
contrast, DS takes “syntax” as characterisable on the basis of general processing
mechanisms (see also Bickhard 1993, 2009).
Secondly, such accounts adopt a standard competence-performance distinc-
tion, interpreting Marr (1982), in seeing the grammar as providing “a description
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of what is being computed” (Kobele, 2012b), i.e., propositional knowledge-that,
with the parser/generator implementing algorithms based on the grammar. DS
explicitly rejects such a view of the distinction between computation vs. algo-
rithm which is based on a view of language as a code, to be analysed on the
model of formal languages (Gregoromichelaki 2013a). This is not just a matter of
theoretical preference. We believe that these conceptual differentiations have
also empirical effects, as we argue in the paper: computational-level accounts
cannot provide satisfactorily natural accounts of the split-utterance data. In
addition, we think that they miss some major generalisations in modelling
syntactic mechanisms (e.g. long-distance dependencies) as sui generis, instead
of qualitatively similar to underspecification-and-update, familiar from seman-
tics/pragmatics, which becomes wholly natural when taking a processing per-
spective (we thank Rieser and Poesio for acknowledging this as a major
theoretical DS contribution).
Thirdly, we believe that in our models we need to differentiate between
ambiguity vs. underspecification. Therefore an account that postulates multiple
underlying derivational analyses cannot be competitive with respect to one which
provides a constructive presentation of a new antecedent for an elliptical frag-
ment. This is what our analysis of VP-ellipsis and other phenomena such as
sluicing require, even though we do adopt a recomputation instead of a reuse
technique as Kobele and Merchant put it. Besides the conceptual issue of
misclassifying underspecification as ambiguity, which leads to missing a signifi-
cant amount of generalisations, in a model like ours, where processing constraints
are taken into account and considered as part of the explanation for linguistic
form/meaning, any unjustifiable spurious ambiguity (e.g. “memoizing” an open-
ended amount of structures, Kobele 2012a) causes cascading explanatory difficul-
ties. Moreover, as we aim to show, the same mechanism of being able to address
the rerunning of parsing/generation actions has much wider applications, for
example, unifying explanations for quotation phenomena, code-switching, and
demonstrations of multimodal stimuli (Gregoromichelaki in press).
Beyond the phenomena of ellipsis, split-utterances, and dialogue, we
believe that ignoring the processing perspective in a grammar creates problems
that generalise as we argue in the paper. Even the most flexible constituency
assumptions break down not only in dialogue but also in monologue as shown
by the parenthetical examples (18)–(21) in the paper and many other phenomena
like extraposition, scrambling, non-constituent coordination, etc. For a grammar
of the type sketched by Kobele, despite some of its pleasing properties, it does
not matter whether the parser/generator operates left-to-right or right-to-left.
Both are possible in principle since the structure is analysed holistically by
breaking down a “sign” to its components. In contrast, the procedures
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implementing actions defined for DS are directional in the sense that their order
of deployment makes a huge difference to the outcome. As Cooper points out,
there are transparent relations to chart parsing here, given the composite
dynamic of partially top-down, partially bottom-up processing. In fact, DS
incorporates as part of the grammar a complete graph of the potential par-
sing/generation paths probabilistically ranked (Sato 2011; Hough 2015). It is
unfortunate that reasons of space prevented us from presenting the whole
current model leading to justifiable objections by Cooper in this respect.
Moreover, indeed, as Cooper notes, DS is similar to a (parallel) ATN architecture
but only at a superficial level. One difference is that structure building (recogni-
tion or generation) in DS is not driven by syntactic categories but by processes
that model psycholinguistic insights (for example, the device of “unfixed nodes”
models memory structures, processes, and limitations). As Cooper himself notes,
another significant feature of DS is that the trees are not records of computation,
showing how a logical expression has been constructed or parsed, but rather
objects of computation themselves. Phonologically-analysed stimuli (‘words’)
are one means to manipulate such objects (among others, Gregoromichelaki in
press, 2017).
It is also not the case, as Cooper complains, that the system freely
evolves in line with each and every newly constructible understanding, yield-
ing in effect a separate grammar for each language (although, in fact, this
might prove not to be a disadvantage as Eshghi and Lemon note, when
coming to model language “in flux” to use Cooper’s terminology). Like many
other frameworks, DS assumes a universal set of elementary actions and
computational rules, grounded in domain-general psychological processes,
and a set of lexical rules which are language-specific. At this abstract level,
there is nothing exotic and different about DS, distinguishing it from other
approaches in highly-lexicalised frameworks like CCG, HPSG or LFG. It is also
similar to even more computationally-oriented and less lexicalised frameworks
like Ranta’s Grammatical Framework (GF, Ranta 2011), where a distinction
between an abstract syntax (a set of rules common to all languages) and
concrete syntax (the linearisation rules for each language) is made. However,
the nature of these rules is another issue and a number of differences can be
found there. Unlike categorial grammar, in DS, by having purely conceptual
structure trees (or indeed TTR representations, Purver et al. 2010) and a
pointer which models attentional focus to indicate currently active states,
word order can be manipulated independently of semantic types and/or com-
binatorial rules. Thus the conceptual types postulated can have universal
application with word-order differences delegated solely to time-linear pointer
movement.
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More fundamentally, all DS procedures implement notions of initial under-
specification and subsequent update (ranging from predictions ensuing without
any linguistic input to very specific constraints imposed by ‘grammaticalised’
forms of underspecification, e.g. reflexive anaphors, case-markers, and island
restrictions). Ordering the resolution of such a large amount of pending under-
specifications is delegated to the management of the position of the pointer at
each parse state. Assuming that the pointer position dictates the possible con-
tinuations in each particular language thus captures the philosophical insight that
knowing a language is “knowing how to go on” (Wittgenstein 1953, para. 154), i.e.
acting coherently, within a language game (see also Eshghi and Lemon; White;
and Cooper). The emphasis here is on acting without presupposing mental state
coordination as a prerequisite (cf. Rieser and Poesio; and Poesio and Rieser
2010), or propositional structure building as an essential motivation for acting.
This explains how various speech-acts can be accomplished by just going on with
the processing of the string, without unnecessarily introducing (meta)descriptions
(conceptualisations) of the acts involved as in (2)-(3):
(2) Hester Collyer: It’s for me.
Mrs Elton the landlady: And Mr. Page?
Hester Collyer: is not my husband. But I would rather you continue to
think of me as Mrs. Page. [from The Deep Blue Sea (film)]
(3) Mother: This afternoon first you’ll do your homework, then wash the
dishes and then
Son: you’ll give me 10 pounds?
In such cases the opening of DS-syntactic dependencies is the motivating factor
underlying the extension of subpropositional parse-states not some already
envisaged propositional whole. And this holds for both comprehension and
production: sub-propositional parse states are also involved in production (in
testing for parsing consequences before generating) while the parse states
themselves self-induce structure-generation to accommodate predicted inputs
in comprehension. So we assume that the grammar architecture models both
production and comprehension as closely linked, rather than isolating them
from each other. In the paper, our analysis of the split-utterance phenomenon
crucially involves the generation of predictions about immediately forthcoming
actions so no overall propositional goal needs to be imposed for well-formed-
ness, i.e. coherence (as mentioned in footnote 9 of the paper). This has con-
sequences both for grammar design and philosophical considerations as we
explain below.
148 Ruth Kempson et al.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/12/17 5:30 PM
2.1 Helpful and unhelpful ellipses
Kobele, for example, dismisses our claim that the competence/performance
dichotomy needs to be revised, on the grounds that the sketch of a model that
delegates the analyses of such phenomena partly to the grammar and partly to a
probabilistic ‘language model’ will successfully model split utterances where the
interrupting participant is intending to match and complete the propositional
content which their interlocutor might have had in mind. From our point of
view, it is conceivable that such an analysis is possible but only if the remit of
explanation is restricted to those interruptions in which the hearer is trying to
articulate what the speaker has in mind to utter, so-called helpful completions
(see Lerner 2004). In these terms, the phenomenon might be seen as parasitic
upon derivations of string-interpretation pairings reflecting sentence-based
knowledge as held by some individual idealised speaker. In fact, such an
analysis has already been provided by Poesio and Rieser (2010)
(as Rieser and Poesio rightly point out), only in much more sophisticated,
thorough, and convincing terms, even though their account involves calculation
of joint intentions instead of a ‘language model’. Indeed, an extension of
Kobele’s style of explanation might arguably be conceived as implementing
the alternative analysis that Poesio and Rieser present in terms of Pickering
and Garrod’s Interactive Alignment model, i.e. as managing the probabilistic
adaptation of each participant’s resources to the other interlocutor. If that’s all
there is in the split utterances phenomenon, as Poesio and Rieser demonstrate,
such cases might not provide grounds for challenging the pragmatic character-
isation of “successful communication” as based on utterances in which the
hearer is able to retrieve through the utterance some interpretation which the
speaker could have had in mind to express (Sperber and Wilson 1995).
However, the problem which (1), and other data in the paper, aim to bring
out is that such “helpful completions” are only a subset of the phenomenon. The
problem that is highlighted with such examples arises when the initiating
participant has no specific overall propositional goal in mind before they start
speaking as is familiar both through introspection and psycholinguistic evidence
(Kleist 1951; Goodwin 1979; Schober and Brennan 2003; Guhe 2007; Demberg-
Winterfors 2010). Moreover, speakers usually produce their utterances in “instal-
ments” or “trial constituents” (Clark 1996) checking as they go along, and
hearers provide acknowledgments, clarifications, or disagreements subsenten-
tially as they process word-by-word, many times leading to the abandonment of
the initiated string when it has served some locally-defined purpose. Moreover,
an interrupting participant may have no intention to use the provided inter-
rupted fragment as providing evidence for their interlocutor’s mental state
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(beliefs, intentions, etc. as have been modelled in exquisite detail by Poesio and
Rieser 2010; Ginzburg 2012, Larsson 2003), instead steering the action towards
their own purposes (see e.g. (3)). In both types of case, there need be no overall
propositionally-articulated contents, let alone sentences, which the initiating
speaker has in mind prior to starting articulating their utterance. In our view,
these data thus demonstrate that while mind-reading might be a sufficient
condition for determining that successful communication takes place, it is not
a necessary condition.
Now the grammar sketched by Kobele (based on De Groote 2001‘s Abstract
Categorial Grammars, ACG) consists of two parallel homomorphically-related
structures, hierarchically-structured strings and semantic values. In this formu-
lation, the computational primitives introduced are indeed minimal; and else-
where Kobele and colleagues, who have done a lot to move current research
towards more representationally-minimal and less “syntactocentric” assump-
tions, claim that such a type of account does not introduce a syntactic level of
representation (Kobele 2012a).3 We acknowledge that this is true. However,
Kobele’s use of the ACG formalism here and similar devices elsewhere still
maintains a view of syntax that is independent and distinct from other cognitive
abilities and, more closely to home, semantics and pragmatics (which is exactly
what DS is designed to refute as White perceptively points out). Here and in
other formulations Kobele and colleagues assign psychological reality to syntac-
tic categories, operations, and global constraints (e.g. the Shortest Move
Constraint) which are assumed to be specifically linguistic and not reducible
to general cognitive constraints (see also Stabler 2011; Stabler 2013). They are
then imposed in the grammar most often nowadays hidden within complex
syntactic categories. The semantic reflexes of such complications are then
inevitably of dubious psychological grounding taking us back to claims of the
‘autonomy of syntax’ hypothesis.
What is more relevant to the issue at hand, this has also empirical con-
sequences. Firstly, if you define a licensing grammar on the basis of string-
constituency, there needs to be a distinguished non-terminal (more generally, a
distinguished type), namely, a sentence (and, derivatively or primarily, a propo-
sition). But then, incomplete, interrupted, or abandoned strings, duplication of
words or corrections (see e.g. (2) earlier), which are not only common but also
essential for dialogue (Clark 1996), will never receive any licensing. Secondly,
despite Kobele’s suggested interpretation of production rules as “actions”, these
3 See also Cooper mentioning Cooper (2014, in prep) where, however, the minimal coverage of
presumed “syntactic” phenomena is not adequate for us to judge whether the claimed epiphe-
nomenal nature of the assumed “syntactic” aspect of the sign can be maintained.
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are not intended as models of human parsing/generation actions unless a
parsing/generation regime is imposed so that they necessarily operate in a
time-linear manner (this is the result of the account being couched at the
computational level). For example, despite Kobele’s claims to the contrary, a
compositional semantics does not give you online incrementality “for free” (even
though, as he rightly points out, the strict competence hypothesis can be thus
maintained). Despite the fact that the grammatical knowledge assumed intrinsi-
cally includes the potential of breaking down sentences to interpretable parts,
again, in particular cases, this has to be imposed by the parsing/generation
control structure and is not given as part of the syntactic apparatus.
Thirdly, as regards Kobele’s comparison with the general DS account, it is
possible to reformulate DS under a proof-search paradigm. This is shown, in a
more succinct and more suitable for our purposes manner, by the sketch of a
translation byWhite, who rightly points out that various explorations have been
undertaken within DS for articulating conceptual structure. However, what
unites all these approaches is the philosophy underlying all DS theoretical
choices, namely, that syntax models the psychological processes of parsing/
generation. So all versions of DS maintain a commitment to keeping the seman-
tic types as much as possible grounded to plausible conceptualisation interpre-
tations. On the other hand, syntactic operations (e.g. unfixed nodes, LINKed
trees, lexical access etc.) model memory operations and articulation and directly
manipulate the assumed conceptual objects (simplified in the paper as trees) as
Cooper points out. Underspecification and update, notions that operate across
cognition, then account for all apparent syntactic restrictions (e.g. the Shortest
Move Constraint). The consequences of abandoning this stance are more evident
in Kobele’s attempt to mimic the DS analyses of (some) split utterances in the
sketch of a framework that he outlines. Like Poesio and Rieser, but presumably
more on the lines of Anderson (1990), he has to invoke probabilistically-based
“rationality” assumptions external to the grammar. It is well-known that such
assumptions eschew the “mechanistic” interpretations of cognitive psychology
(Anderson 1990). But such mechanistic explanations are exactly the point of
modelling the phenomena through DS. More specifically, the DS account, by
including production and predictive processing within the grammar, is able to
substantiate in more explicit and explanatory terms the account that Kobele
sketches: it is because the grammar itself operates via predictions that a hearer
who assigns high likelihood to an upcoming conceptual content can attempt
lexical access and vocalise a continuation. They do not have to “guess” or
metarepresent mental states regarding the other interlocutor. Kobele might
argue that such “rationality”/optimisation constraints are not to be regarded
as part of the grammar since he wants to identify a specifically linguistic “causal
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power” that explains linguistic structuring (but cf. Kobele et al. 2013). However,
if one is prepared to accept a run-of-the-mill probabilistic grammar (Hale 2006),
what is the justification for saying that processes that operate at more compre-
hensive levels should in principle be excluded from the model? Are we not
missing a generalisation here?
Notice also that, contra toKobele, such “fragments” do not necessarily have to
be parts of sentences since they can be perceived and understood well enough but
nevertheless abandoned midway (see e.g. (1)). Moreover, there are also the cases
where the two “ split” strings may add up to an ungrammatical string, because of
the change of speaker, and yet constitute a perfectly well-formed exchange. This
was illustrated in the paper by example (28), among others, repeated below:
(4) A emerging from a smoking kitchen
A: I’ve burnt the kitchen rather badly.
B: Have you burnt
A: Myself? No.
In describing our analysis, Kobele seems to have misunderstood the whole point
of our account and indeed the framework: we do not “make the objects speakers
and hearers are generating more abstract” because interlocutors are not
assumed to produce/comprehend syntactic structures. So it is not syntactic
structures that are extended during the processing of split utterances. Even
though Kobele attempts to mimic our solution formulated in his terms, he
never answers the crucial question: how is this string-interpretation ever
licensed in his grammar since the phonological string cannot be generated
(licensed, “proved”) as a whole? Is the ‘language model’ implementing the
rationality assumptions able to override the grammar? This is of course a
possible account but it seems to us very unnatural compared with the natural-
ness of the example.
3 Ambiguity vs. context-dependence
Kobele and Merchant focus on the subpart of our paper in which, as part of a
critique of standard frameworks, we argue that the assumption of a starting
symbol for a phrase structure grammar that licenses all linguistic structures
would force sentential (or at least constituent) analyses for various types of
“fragments” we identify. This is not such an extraordinary assumption as they
present it to be nor a “straw man” especially given that we have not been given
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an answer as to how their own grammar comes to license non-sentential
strings.4 Even Ginzburg (2012), who otherwise soundly and forcefully eschews
a syntactic account of ellipsis, assigns NPs-projecting-to-S analyses to non-
sentential utterances for theory-internal technical reasons having to do with
the structure of the independent syntactic component assumed (for more ortho-
dox syntactic analyses see Ludlow 2005; Marti 2006; Weir 2014 a.o.). We are very
pleased to hear and applaud the fact that Kobele and Merchant would not have
to resort to such analyses; and we might be convinced that they can potentially
handle the types of “fragments” that Merchant mentions. But, under their
analyses sketched in various places, we do not understand Merchant’s com-
plaints having to do with the flexibility of our system: surely, allowing for a
variety of sui-generis mechanisms (deletion, type-shifting, complex categories,
etc.) to implement resolutions for a variety of fragments (Merchant and
Merchant 2004; Merchant 2010) is a clear presentation of a multitude of
explanatory resources at their disposal too (and, still, data such as in (4) cannot
be captured). We ask then in turn: for each particular analysis cited inMerchant
and Merchant and Kobele what prevents any of the other postulated mechan-
isms from applying in that case and overgenerating analyses and licensing?
Indeed, we insist that the flexibility of resources assumed in DS is justified by
the complexity of the data being analysed. For example, Merchant and Kobele
claim that the hardest cases are those such as The information could have been
released but Gorbachov chose not to where ellipsis reconstruction involves “devia-
tions from identity”; and they suggest that these “seem likely to pose a problem
for KCGC”. We believe that this might reflect a misunderstanding: to the contrary,
the DS account of ellipsis is based on a parallelism with anaphora, namely, again,
employing initial underspecification and subsequent update. One type of update
is copying contextual content directly rather than rerunning actions to construct
structure anew (i.e. unlike what happens in sloppy/paycheck readings cases). This
mechanism (also employed for the processing of bound pronouns) in the passive
surface non-identity cases allows reconstruction of content by replicating the
content of the antecedent directly, rather than by making reference to the
words. The supposedly problematic reconstruction of an ellipsis site from the
predicate of the antecedent thus turns out to be precisely what is needed in
such cases since, at the level of conceptual structure, the surface syntactic subject
of the antecedent VP, being a passive form, will end up providing content at the
object argument node. However, notice that the DS account employs exactly the
4 In contrast, Barton (1991) provides such an answer although not an analysis as fine-grained
as will be needed for our data, while Minimalist analyses like Progovac (2006) allow for non-
sentential licensing but only for a subset of “fragments”; both do not embrace incrementality.
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same mechanisms for ellipsis resolution here as those that are the basis of
implementing anaphora resolution with its restricted linguistically bound (e.g.
anaphors and bound variables) and freer indexical construals so that all such
phenomena appear unified.
In contrast, Merchant argues that even ellipsis data, including split
utterances, do not constitute a natural phenomenon (as do Rieser and
Poesio). In confronting indexical situation-recoverable ellipsis, which is proble-
matic for syntactic accounts if they aim at uncovering generalisations, he bites
the bullet and proposes a type-shifting rule for interpreting predicates occurring
without their arguments overtly. It seems to us that this semantic operation with
no string-related consequences is of a completely different nature to his other-
wise structural account of ellipsis, thus contra-indicating the generality of that
form of analysis. On the other hand, with situation-recoverable ellipsis which
nonetheless requires appropriate choice of morphological form, he has to invoke
yet another licensing mechanism, that of the presence of an implied “script”,
which, nevertheless, has to be linguistically-articulated in order to impose
“structural case” (cf. Barton 1991; Progovac 2006). These analyses add to the
panoply of accounts of ellipsis with the unacceptably high levels of ambiguity
for each linguistic element occurring in each particular context. We believe that,
despite the apparent flexibility, rather than simply create a list of different types
of data, our analysis to the contrary strives to take these data as signalling the
systemic nature of context-dependence in natural language. And we plead guilty
to Rieser and Poesio’s charge that we attempt to unify apparently diverse
phenomena like that of split utterances, against the backdrop of that much
more general problem. Take for example the following, which, Merchant argues,
is not elliptical in any way:
(5) A: The doctor
B: Chorlton?
A: Yeah Chorlton, he insisted that I have further tests.
We agree with his conclusion. However, as a case of clarification ellipsis, it
would be analysed as sentential (an NP that projects S) and propositional in the
most prominent account of clarifications, namely, Ginzburg’s, especially since in
other languages (e.g. Greek) such NPs will have to bear the appropriate case-
marking in parallel with Merchant’s examples of indexically-resolved script-
related fragments.
Under our analysis, A’s first utterance is an opening towards a continuation,
anticipating some form of propositional completion. To this initial utterance, B
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provides a follow up clarification which, depending on the intonation, can be
perceived either as clarification request or clarification offer. A then replies with
a further non-sentential element in agreement. This then anaphorically links in
to the structure that follows through the overt pronoun he. The issue in this type
of example is not so much whether these are ellipses of a sentential sort or not
(though arguably the opening utterance would by standard assumptions be seen
in such terms, needing a predicate). More significant is that what the interpreta-
tion of such fragments shows is how the immediate preceding structure is the
crucial context relative to which the fragment itself is construed as an update
(Gregoromichelaki et al. 2013). The process both of inducing structure and the
attribution of content to that structure are thus essentially context-dependent.
And it is this puzzle, with its additional problem of apparently needing some
processes of higher order inference on the part of the participants in the form of
mind-reading, which the DS analysis aims to defuse.
This is achieved by adopting a low-level mode of explanation in which such
fluent role-switching interactivity is a side-effect of grammar-internal mechan-
isms determining that structure/interpretation is built up on an incremental
word-by-word basis for both parties. For the case of data like B’s utterance
in (5), we have at least two options corresponding to distinct construals: for
cases where this is an offer of clarification, we will analyse those as simply
appositional (as Rieser and Poesio observe). For the cases where B’s utterance
is analysed as a clarification request, it is essential for its explanation to include
mention of the assumption, present in DS at least since Sato (2011), that the full
architecture incorporates a full model of the grammatical context as probabil-
istically-ranked options of all the next states that the grammar licenses at each
word-processing step. This is illustrated in the form of a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) (Eshghi et al. 2011; Eshghi et al. 2013; Hough 2015; Hough and Purver
2014; 2017). Clarification requests and their responses are then modelled not as
part of the semantic structure via modelling some presumed conceptualisation
of speech-act descriptions but, procedurally, as backtracking movements along
the DAG potentially leading subsequently to distinct previously disfavoured
processing paths (Eshghi et al. 2015). The same mechanism is employed for
self-corrections and other disfluencies (Hough 2015) and the explanation of how
puns and other word-plays operate (Gregoromichelaki in press). For our pur-
poses, this implies that the split-utterance data in all their complexity fall out as
an immediate consequence, without having to invoke any externally imposed
higher-order mode of inference or “grammaticalised” speech-act characterisa-
tions, only the assumption of a shared grammar that enables interlocutors to go
on with processing in the hope that trouble will be resolved downstream. In fact,
as White points out, local representations of the shared context might not be
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isomorphically related. This does not seem to impede communication5 as long
as the low-level actions are “choreographed” appropriately so that they coordi-
nate.6 More broadly, in fact, in our view, the non-equivalence of the ‘wide’
content (Rieser and Poesio) of the conceptual structures locally assembled by
each participant is the source of all the significant effects that interaction confers
(Healey 1997; 2008; Healey et al. 2014) and the basis of linguistic creativity and
conceptual abstraction (Mills 2011; Cooper). But, we suggest, we should not
confuse the function with its result: natural languages are not phonology-
semantics mappings, instead they are mechanisms for performing such map-
pings ad hoc in each context (Bickhard 1993; 2009; Gregoromichelaki 2017;
Gregoromichelaki in press; and cf. Cooper in preparation 2017).
As Rieser and Poesio indicate, we should therefore confirm here that the
DS account turns on not representing propositional descriptions of speakers’
attitudes to the content of what is uttered as an essential part of the output
interpretation or planned utterance (unlike the Gricean account of meaningNN )
(Grice 1975). We accept that natural languages are the par excellence expres-
sions of a symbolic system of conceptualisation and this is what our trees reflect
(in simplistic form, for more elaborate models and variations, see Purver et al.
2010; Hough 2015; Gregoromichelaki in press). But, further than this, we do not
believe that every nuance of meaning has to be reified and expressed as a
conceptual structure element in the meaning representations. As Eshghi and
Lemon very convincingly argue, meaning depends on the language games the
language users are engaged in. Their model instantiates how we conceive the
analysis of (implicit) speech act characterisations (see also Gregoromichelaki
and Kempson 2015). Language games as types are malleable learned routines
involving complementary non-linguistic and linguistic actions that constitute
knowledge-how that language users accumulate. The processual coherence
afforded within such games has to be constructed each time subsuming the
actions that linguistic stimuli trigger (hence our analysis of morphological cases
and other structural indications of indexical construals as not necessitating the
presence of linguistically-derived contents). So at each re-enactment of such a
game not only is retrospective context provided but also the contents assigned to
physical actions, environmental stimuli, and linguistic elements are recomputed
(Mills and Gregoromichelaki 2010). So, to answer Rieser and Poesio’s question
5 For arguments that they are not necessarily distinct, as Ginzburg (2012) argues, see
Gregoromichelaki and Kempson (2015).
6 For more such relevant, in our view, assumptions pertaining to the issue of synchronising
processes from distinct sources, see Rieser (2016) where a calculus is proposed for emergent
choreographing of the various channels of communication.
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regarding propositions, our analyses of non-sentential utterances presuppose
neither linguistic elements (e.g. verbs) nor even conceptual elements (e.g. pre-
dicates) in the context because we do not assume that language users necessa-
rily explicitly conceptualise descriptions of the routines they are able to
participate in (contra Cooper and unlike what Merchant refers to as “scripts”
if we have understood his claim correctly). People develop coordinative patterns
of behaviour, learn ‘how to go on’, but following a ‘rule’ is distinct from
‘knowing’ this rule (Wittgenstein 1953, para. 202). Hence non-sentential utter-
ances are shareable without meta-representational assumptions because they
integrate within such shared games and there is no need for explicit conceptua-
lisation of descriptions of the dialogue moves made. Unless there is explicit
indication of illocutionary force, we therefore eschew fine-grained categorisa-
tions of speech acts and attitudes. Instead, we attempt to provide mechanistic
characterisations of the routines involved (see, for example, Eshghi et al. 2015).
On the other hand, we do not doubt that interlocutors can and often do
conceptualise such routines and the content of their actions (as Cooper indi-
cates). This is shown by the fact that there are lexicalisations of descriptions of
such speech acts (performatives). In such cases, the representation of meta-level
attitudes can indeed be modelled as adjuncts to the structure under construc-
tion, as so-called LINKed structures (Purver et al. 2010; Gregoromichelaki and
Kempson 2015), but such explicit representation of meta-level attitudes is not a
sine qua non of successful communication. And given the ease with which very
young children can participate in split utterance activity, this suggests, at the
least, a robust alternative to explore (see Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011).
In one sense the phenomenon of ambiguity in natural language is deeply
familiar: it is everywhere, something so common that it is generally taken merely
as diagnostic of natural language, a challenge for the child to grapple with in
coming to acquire a grammar, to whom innate capacity is attributed in order to
render the acquisition task possible at all. But, on this view, the mystery of
first language acquisition deepens year by year as the numbers of ambiguities
multiply – with the unearthing of yet another type of ellipsis, yet another speech
act, yet another type of implicature, yet another type of relative clause, etc.
However, as Rieser and Poesio pointed out, according to the DS perspective,
such dependency of natural language expressions on the attendant context is
even interwoven with the structural architecture of language itself: it is the very
heart of what language is about, the clue to its flexibility, its lack of determinate
fixing of boundaries. In this, we suggest, language is like vision and other forms of
cognitive processing which, according to Clark (2013, 2016), are all active processes
which are invariably determined relative to the specifics of the context, our physical
stance, what we have just been thinking about, our emotions, our physical state.
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Context on this understanding ranges over conceptual representations, whether
constructed in virtue of the processing of some immediately previous string, from
memory, or as a reflection of objects in or related to the current scenario and
participation in some language game, or even the processing actions just executed
as parser or producer. Given the DS stance on ‘syntax’ as the progressive manipula-
tion of domain-general representations, there is no arbitrary division to be made
between grammar-internal and grammar-external representations.7
At this juncture, it is important to stress that we do not refuse, as a matter of
ideology, ever to sustain claims of ambiguity for phenomena: the dispute whether
given phenomena constitute ambiguity or underspecification is not a simple dichot-
omy. To the contrary, natural languages are evolved systems subject to both cultural
and psychological constraints which determine routinisations of usage leading over
time to calcified, distinct lexical entries, so claims of ambiguity for individual cases
may always be justifiable. But we urge any such move has to be on a case by case
basis (which is a process superbly illustrated in Merchant’s work despite our
disagreements about the outcomes) reflecting the many psychological, physiologi-
cal and sociological considerations that can impinge on how languages change.
4 Comparing alternative dynamic frameworks
and extensions
In his evaluation of the importance of articulating dynamic alternatives to the
more conventional static frameworks, Cooper suggests ways in which DS
effects might be transferred in independently justified frameworks,
specifically TTR; and these clearly warrant further probing. TTR, as far as
we can see and at least in its bare form, has not been developed to capture
the rich array of empirical results established to date within the
DS framework8 (but cf. Ginzburg 2012; Ginzburg et al. 2014). There are,
7 Despite his embodied stance on the nature of mind/brain, A. Clark remains agnostic over
whether such representations are epiphenomenal. Like him, we remain open on the issue of
whether such representationalism may turn out to be ultimately eliminable.
8 For example, Kempson and Kiaer (2010) for Korean multiple scrambling, Gregoromichelaki
(2013b) and Chatzikyriakidis (2010, 2012, 2017) for various clitic related phenomena in Greek
and dialects of Greek, Bouzouita (2008) for the diachrony of the Spanish clitic system, Cann
(2011) for idiosyncracies of the English auxiliary system, Cann and Wu (2011) for idiosyncracies
in Chinese passive forms, Sehraku (2013) on Japanese clefts and the restricted optionality of
case marking, Gibson (2015) for idiosyncratic left-peripheral word orderings in Rangi, a typolo-
gically exceptional Bantu language.
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without doubt, reasons to find constructive type theory attractive,
especially concerning sublexical meaning and interfaces with multimodal
inputs and outputs (Larsson 2011), thereby indicating a TTR extension of
what DS offers, as long as the time-linear dimension of analysis that DS
imposes is respected, which we do not doubt is feasible given the expressiv-
ity of TTR as a formalism (see Purver et al. 2010; Eshghi et al. 2013;
Gregoromichelaki in press).
Similarly, White suggests a high-level point of view from category theory
that, in a developed form, is certainly a promising perspective from which we
might be able to glean some deeper truths underlying the specifics of our
analyses. Moreover, the issue of exploring the effects of seriously thinking
about concurrency, along with incrementality (sequentiality), is a revealing
approach to be taken we believe, a perspective that indeed has been taken up
in recent work by Rieser (Rieser 2016), admittedly for other purposes.
Speculatively, we suspect that therein lie the rudiments of a mechanistic pro-
cessual account of mental state coordination rather than the imposition of
mindreading computations. The implications of the concurrency of comprehen-
sion and production processes have not been explored in depth in DS even
though, like Hendriks (2014), we do assume that both need to be modelled
within the grammar. In this connection, we note that in not positing mind-
reading as the underlying condition of communicative actions, but instead
predictive, goal-directed processing, the DS perspective is commensurate with
A. Clark’s explication of the entanglement of action and perception in cognition:
in preparing for cognitive response, whether in action or perception, low-level
proprioceptive preparations for action are involved, not higher order forms of
inference (cf. Frith 2007; Tomasello 2008; Friston and Frith 2015). From this
point of view, any asymmetries between generation and parsing are directly
analogous to the assumption of that framework that all cognitive responses
involve actions. It is in virtue of this perspective, that we have reason not to
follow Hendriks (2014) in her claim that production and comprehension are
radically different processes despite Rieser and Poesio drawing our attention
to her work as grounds for their own scepticism of our integrative stance (see
also Kempen et al. 2012; Kempen 2014). Like Clark, we would see the distinc-
tiveness of parsing and generation as explained at the lower level of the
mechanisms themselves in the variant forms of realisation expected (see also
Hurley 1998; Gregoromichelaki 2013a). However, we completely agree with
Hendriks (2014) in eschewing the view of NLs as codes with fixed form-meaning
mappings and, concomitantly, that any comprehension-production differentia-
tions lie entirely within the purview of the grammar.
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Relatedly, as Cooper rightly complains about, reasons of space did not
allow the full presentation of the architecture we assume, which does include
speaker-hearer parameters and perspective differentiation. In fact, since Sato
(2011), DS has incorporated a full model of context with probabilistically-ranked
options of all the next states that the grammar licenses at each word-processing
step. As we said earlier, this is illustrated in the form of a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) fully articulated in Eshghi et al. (2011), (2013); Hough (2015); Hough and
Purver (2014). On the basis of this architecture, Eshghi et al. (2015) model the
distinct perspectives of speaker and hearer when issues of feedback arise,
namely, backchannel acknowledgments and clarification issuing and repair.
This mechanistic account from within the grammar constitutes an explication
that does not resort to mindreading as we mentioned earlier.
Moreover, Cooper’s other complaint that DS misses the significance of the
sense in which knowledge of language can be seen as event-type characterisa-
tion would seem to us not exactly accurate. At the most fundamental level, DS
models the process of characterising or producing linguistic events so the
speech event is modelled directly across the flow from its initiation to its end.
The requisite speech-event parameters are also included, having adopted a
version of Poesio and Rieser’s ‘micro-events’, a modelling of the individual
sub-events that make up that flow of time as identified by word boundaries
(Purver et al. 2010; Gregoromichelaki 2017). Where Cooper is right is that we do
not impose an abstraction over this process in order to have the grammar just
assigning a (static) type to an utterance event (cf. Ginzburg 2012). However, even
this potential has been exploited within DS by employing ad-hoc TTR-types to
characterise on the fly grammatical performances (DS-action executions) pre-
sented as “demonstrations” for purposes of explaining quotation phenomena
and code-switching (Gregoromichelaki in press; cf. Ginzburg and Cooper 2014).
Furthermore, recent work within the same architecture shows not only DS’s
viability as a grammar formalism, but also its fit to include multi-modal data, and
the provision it makes available to enable a large amount of dialogue data to be
acquired from very small amounts of unannotated data using a combination of DS
and Reinforcement Learning (Yu et al 2016; Kalatzis et al. 2016). The model then
has notable links with first-language acquisition. Eve Clark (2009) and colleagues
emphasise the central role that interaction plays in a child’s linguistic develop-
ment (Clark and Casillas 2016; see also Hilbrink et al. 2015). As Eshghi and
Lemon point out, the framework supports straightforward learning of speech
act conventions simply from the interactive exchanges that take place in informal
conversation. Indeed, Eshghi, Lemon and colleagues already have the beginnings
of work demonstrating how an agent can learn from very small data sets, given
nondeterminism in the selected strategies, the availability of clarification devices
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whenever needed, and the ability to evaluate between alternative strategies. With
increasing evidence (Eshghi et al. 2013) of such learning, there is therefore
emergent research that learning by a child in interaction with other agents is
possible with the outcome of yielding a functioning grammar. This in its turn
promises to open a window on a wholly new and gradualist account of language
evolution broadly in line with Christiansen and Chater (2016), but with commu-
nicative success being grounded in interaction rather than in recognition of
higher-order intentions. However, Eshghi and Lemon correctly note that the
implemented DS framework presumes that lexical specifications are shared
between parties, at least in relation to their structural attributes. In this connection
though, current work (Cann and Kempson forthcoming) has begun to attempt the
formulation of how lexical specifications never constitute more than constraints
on concept construction, so that concepts are invariably constructed and predi-
cates developed, rather than being provided directly by lexical encoding. It seems
to us that TTR-modelling of ad hoc type construction is also a viable strategy in
this direction (Cooper 2012; Gregoromichelaki 2016). Nonetheless, as Eshghi and
Lemon rightly point out, there is a big gap from such elementary steps to a full-
blown explanation of how child or adult grammars may develop and change in
interaction with other agents and in relation to the scenario within which such
interaction is taking place. There is also the important issue of the status of group
within any account of evolution (Sober and Wilson 1998; Wilson 2002). While
gaps such as these remain, any account of either first-language acquisition or the
corresponding narrative of language evolution will remain no more than promis-
sory notes, and importantly incomplete.
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